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between $2364 and $4031, drops from a 2.6
percent growth rate in the first period to 1
percent in the second. The second quintile
($4086-8977) falls even further: from 3.1 percent
in the first period to 1.3 percent in the second
period.
Even the top quintile, which at $9012 to $43,713
contains a mixture of middle-income and high-
income countries shows a sizeable falloff in
growth, from 2.6 percent in the first period to
only 1.3 percent in the second period.
The only group which does not show a slowdown
in growth is the bottom quintile, with per capita
income between $355 and $1225 annually, where
growth increases slightly, from 1.7 to 1.8 percent.
However this is still not a good average
performance for the poorest developing
countries, and the slight improvement disappears
without India and China.
! A decline in the rate of improvement for
life expectancy was found for the vast
majority of low- and middle-income countries.
(See Figure 2) The biggest drop was in the
fourth quintile, with life expectancy between
44 and 53. These countries saw an average
annual increase of 0.56 years for 1960-1980,
but almost no progress — 0.03 years for the
second period. Over 20 or 25 years this makes
a large difference. For the first period,
countries in this quintile increased their life
expectancy by about 11 years. If this rate of
improvement had continued, the countries in
this quintile in the second period would have
raised life expectancy by 12 years; instead they
saw an increase of only 0.7 years.
The bottom, middle, and second quintiles also
saw declines in the rate of progress. The only
his paper looks at the available data on economic
growth and various social indicators — including
health outcomes and education — and compares the
last 25 years (1980-2005)1 with the prior two decades
(1960-1980). The paper finds that, contrary to popular
belief, the past 25 years (1980-2005) have seen a sharply
slower rate of economic growth and reduced progress
on social indicators for the vast majority of low- and
middle-income countries.
Countries are divided into quintiles on the basis of their
starting point at the beginning of each period. The study
therefore does not compare the performance of the same
country over the two periods, because this would tend
to find reduced progress for the second period due to
“diminishing returns.” In other words, it would be more
difficult for a country to move from a life expectancy of
70 to 75, than from 50 to 55. By comparing the
performance of countries that start out at a certain level
in 1960, with countries that start out at the same level
in 1980, this study avoids the possibility of interpreting
such inherent limits on progress as evidence of failure
in the second period.
Among the findings:
! A sharp fall-off in the growth of GDP per
capita was found for all groups of countries
except the bottom quintile. (See Figure 1) In
the fourth quintile, marked by per capita incomes
between $1238 and $2364, growth falls from 2.4
percent annually in the first period to 0.7 percent
in the second period. To get an idea how much
difference this makes over time, at 2.4 percent
growth the country’s income per person will
double in about 29 years. At 0.7 percent growth,
it would take 99 years.
Executive Summary
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1 Or most recent available year.exception was the highest quintile, with life
expectancy between 69 and 76 years. This
quintile showed some improvement in the
second period, which was driven by the high-
income countries in the group.
! A decline in the rate of improvement for
adult mortality was found for male and female
adults, for most groups. (See Figures 5 and
6). For females, all quintiles except the best
one show worse performance for the second
period, with the fourth quintile showing an
actual increase (rather than a decline in the rate
of reduction) in mortality rates. For males, the
bottom three quintiles show worse
performance for the second period, with the
fourth quintile showing an actual increase in
mortality rates.
! A decline in the rate of progress for child
(under 5) mortality was found across all
quintiles, although the reduction in progress is
relatively small in the top two quintiles. (See
Figure 7).
! A decline in the rate of improvement for
infant mortality was found for all groups of
countries. (See Figure 8).
! A reduction in the rate of increase of public
spending on education was found for all
groups of countries. (See Figure 9).  For the
higher income countries, this is partly
attributable to demographic changes.
! A reduction in the rate of increase in
secondary school enrollment was also found
across all groups of countries, in addition to a
reduced rate of increase for primary school
enrollment for the bottom two quintiles.
Implications
Over the past 25 years a number of economic reforms
have taken place in low and middle-income countries.
These reforms, as a group, have been given various
labels: “liberalization,” “globalization,” or “free-market”2
are among the most common descriptions. Among the
reforms widely implemented have been the reduction
of restrictions on international trade and capital flows,
large-scale privatizations of state-owned enterprises,
tighter fiscal and monetary policies (higher interest rates),
labor market reforms, and increasing accumulation of
foreign reserve holdings. There is a general consensus
that the majority of developing countries have benefited
economically from the reforms, even if they have
sometimes been accompanied by increasing inequality
or other unintended consequences.
The evidence in this paper indicates that this consensus
could be mistaken. The trends in growth rates and social
indicators are overwhelmingly in the same direction,
showing a reduced rate of progress over the last 25 years.
It is generally difficult to show a clear relationship
between any particular policy change and economic
outcomes, especially across countries. There are many
changes that take place at the same time, and causality
is difficult to establish. It is certainly possible that the
decline in economic and social progress that has taken
place over the last 25 years would have been even worse
in the absence of the policy changes that were adopted.
But that remains to be demonstrated. In the meantime,
a long-term failure of the type documented here should
at the very least shift the burden of proof to those who
maintain that the major policy changes of the last 25
years have raised living standards in the majority of
developing countries, and encourage skepticism with
regard to economists or institutions who believe they
have found a formula for economic growth and
development. Most importantly, the outcome of the last
25 years should have economists and policy-makers
thinking about what has gone wrong.
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2 The latter term, as well as “free trade,” is inaccurate as a matter
of economics, since the reforms have included very costly
forms of protectionism — e.g. increased patent and copyright
protection — as well as such policies as fixed exchange rates,
which are the opposite of “free-market” policies.Over the past 25 years a number of
economic reforms have taken place in low
and middle-income countries. These
reforms, as a group, have been given various
labels: “liberalization,” “globalization,” or
“free-market”3 are among the most
common descriptions. Among the reforms
widely implemented have been the
reduction of restrictions on international
trade and capital flows, large-scale
privatizations of state-owned enterprises,
tighter fiscal and monetary policies (higher
interest rates), labor market reforms, and
increasing accumulation of foreign reserve
holdings. Many of these reforms have been
implemented with the active support of
multilateral lending institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, as well as the G-7
governments, and have often been
required in order for countries to have
access to credit from these and other
sources. But regardless of origin, labels or
political perspectives, there is a general
consensus that the majority of developing
countries have benefited economically
from the reforms, even if they have
sometimes been accompanied by increasing
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This paper looks at the available data on
economic growth and various social indicators
— including health outcomes and education
— and finds that, contrary to popular belief,
the past 25 years have seen a sharply slower
rate of economic growth and reduced progress
on social indicators for the vast majority of
low and middle-income countries. Of course
it is still possible that some or even all of the
policy reforms of the past 25 years have had
net positive effects, or that they will have such
an impact at some point in the future. But the
fact that these effects have not yet shown up
in the data, for developing countries as a
group — and that in fact the data show a
marked decline in progress over the last
quarter-century —  is very significant. If the
data and trends presented below were well
known, it would very likely have an impact
on policy discussions and research. Most
importantly, there would be a much greater
interest in finding out what has gone wrong
over the last 25 years.
In order to evaluate the progress of the last
25 years, it is necessary to have a benchmark
for comparison. In other words, for the world
as a whole, there is almost always economic
growth, technological progress, and therefore
social progress over time. The relevant
question is not whether there has been income
growth and social progress, but the rate of
such progress as compared with what has been
feasible in the past.
For this paper, we have chosen to compare
the past 25 years (1980-2005)5 with the
previous 20 years: 1960-1980. This is a fair
comparison. While the 1960s were a period
5 For some indicators the most recent data does not
extend to 2005, e.g. life expectancy goes only to 2002.
3 The latter term, as well as “free trade,” is inaccurate
as a matter of economics, since the reforms have
included very costly forms of protectionism — e.g.
increased patent and copyright protection — as well
as such policies as fixed exchange rates, which are the
opposite of “free-market” policies.
4 “Globalisation has brought enormous benefits in
growth and efficiency. Yet this same force has brought
cross-border financial crises and heightened the
imperative to bring into the mainstream those who
are being left behind.” — Rodrigo De Rato, Managing
Director of the IMF,  Financial Times (September 14,
2005).of exceptional economic performance, the 1970s
suffered from two major oil shocks that led to worldwide
recessions: in 1974-75, and again at the end of the
decade. The seventies were also a period of high inflation
in both developing and developed countries. So this
twenty-year period is not a particularly high benchmark
for comparison with the most recent 25 years. If the
1950s were included, it would have made the benchmark
for comparison higher, since the 1950s were generally a
period of good growth for the developing world. But
there is not much good data for the 1950s; and many of
the developing countries did not become independent
until the late 1950s or 1960s.
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five groups, depending on their starting point at the
beginning of each of the two periods. For example, if
we look at Figure 1, there are five groups of countries
sorted by per capita income. The middle quintile includes
countries with an income per person between $2364 and
$4031 (in constant 2000 dollars). These are countries
that started out either in 1960 or 1980 with a GDP per
person in this range. The other quintiles range from the
poorest ($355-1225) to the richest ($9012-$43,713).
Looking at the middle quintile, at the bottom of the
graph we can see that there were 24 countries that started
the 1960s in this range of per capita GDP ($2364 to
$4031), but 33 countries that started the 1980s in this
One way to compare the performance of the two periods
(1980-2005 and 1960-1980) would be to simply compare
how each group of countries did in the first period, with
the same group of countries’ performance for the second
period. The problem with such a comparison is that it
may be more difficult to make the same amount of
progress from a higher level than when starting from a
lower level. For example, this is certainly true for some
levels of life expectancy: it would be more difficult to
raise life expectancy from 70 to 75 years than to raise it
from 50 to 55. A comparison of the same countries for
the two periods would therefore tend to find a diminished
rate of progress simply because of this inherent difficulty
that comes from progress during the first period. This is
not what we want to measure.
The Scorecard on Development ! 5
Standards of Comparison
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In other words, it is reasonable to expect that countries
starting at any particular level (e.g. of income or life
expectancy) will perform better in the second period
(1980 to 2005), simply because the advance of
technology and knowledge over 20 years has created
more and better practices that are available to be
adopted. 
range. This is to be expected, as some of the countries
from the bottom two quintiles moved into the middle
quintile as a result of their growth during the first period.6
On this basis, we can make a fair comparison — not of
the same countries over time, which would suffer from
the problems described above — but between all the
countries that started the first period at a certain level
of income, and all the countries that started the second
period at that same level. We can do the same for the
social indicators as well.
In fact, this methodology should bias the data towards
finding better results for the second period. There should
generally be possibilities for countries to gain by
borrowing from the technology and practices of other
countries that are richer or have achieved higher levels
of the various social indicators. As a result of the progress
made in the first period, there were far more possibilities
for faster improvement in the second period. For example,
in the case of life expectancy(Figure 2), there were only
16 countries at the start of the first period (1960) with
life expectancy of more than 69 years. This meant that
countries in the next lowest grouping, with life
expectancies from 63 to 69 years, would have a relatively
limited number of countries from which to adopt better
public health measures, medicines, or medical practices.
However, at the start of the second period (1980), there
were 50 countries with life expectancies of more than
69 years. This should have provided a far larger set of
practices that the countries in the second grouping (with
life expectancies from 63 to 69 years) could adopt to
improve health care in their own country in the second
period. The same would also be true for all the countries
further down the ladder in life expectancy.
6 In this data set there are also 65 countries (out of 175) for which
there are only data for the 1980-2005 period, and not for 1960-1980.
The number of countries in each group also changes as countries
move up from one quintile to the next on the basis of progress in the
first period.The growth of income (or GDP) per person is the most
basic measure of economic progress that economists use.
Of course this ignores the distribution of income, as
well as environmental and health outcomes. And there
are things that raise GDP that do not increase human
welfare: e.g. more people buying cigarettes and alcohol
and then having to be treated for resulting health
impairment. But as a broad measure of economic
progress it is by far the most important. When we look
at GDP per person, we are deliberately factoring out
population growth, since any growth in the economy that
is only due to population growth does not improve living
standards. Ignoring for the moment any change in labor
force participation, we are really looking at productivity
growth. For developing countries especially, it is the
increase in productivity over time that enables a country
to have higher living standards. As productivity grows,
a smaller proportion of the country’s resources is
allocated to the necessities of life, and more can be
dedicated to education, health care, and investment in
future growth. In general, and especially over long
enough periods of time, productivity growth will improve
the lives of the majority of the population, including
the poor.7 To the extent that any of the reduced progress
over the last 25 years measured by social indicators, as
noted in subsequent sections of this paper is due to
economic changes — and much of it is — it is almost
certainly due to declining growth rates rather than
changes in the distribution of income.8
Figure 1 shows the annual rate of growth of GDP (or
income) per capita for the two periods (1960-1980 and
1980-2005). The 175 countries are divided into quintiles
The Slowdown in Economic Growth
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according to their per capita income at the start of each
period, as explained above. There is a pronounced
slowdown in growth for each quintile, except for the
bottom quintile. Taking the three middle quintiles first,
which are all low- and middle-income countries, the
difference between the two periods is striking. In the
fourth quintile, marked by incomes between $1238 and
$2332, growth falls from 2.4 percent annually in the first
period to 0.7 percent in the second period. To get an
idea how much difference this makes over time, at 2.4
percent growth the country’s income per person will
double in about 29 years. At 0.7 percent growth, it would
take 99 years.
The declines in the next two quintiles are also severe.
The middle quintile, with GDP per capita between $2364
and $4031, drops from a 2.6 percent growth rate in the
first period to 1 percent in the second. The second
quintile ($4086-8977) falls even further: from 3.1 percent
in the first period to 1.3 percent in the second period.
Even the top quintile, which at $9012 to $43,713
contains a mixture of middle-income and high-income
countries shows a sizeable falloff in growth, from 2.6
percent in the first period to only 1.3 percent in the
second period. It is worth noting that in the top quintile,
the result is mainly driven by the middle-income
countries.
As noted above, the comparison in each of these quintiles
is not for the same countries over the two periods, but
for the countries that start each period at the level of
income defined by the per capita income boundaries of
the quintile. Some countries will move up to higher levels,
as we would expect on the basis of progress between
1960-1980. So, for example, Sri Lanka, Indonesia,
Lesotho, and the Gambia all started out in the bottom
quintile in 1960 but began the second period (1980) in
the next quintile up.  Morocco, Thailand, and Botswana
moved two quintiles, from the bottom to the third
(middle) quintile. At the bottom of the table is listed
7 See e.g. Dollar, David and Aart Kraay. 2000. “Growth is Good for
the Poor.” The World Bank. A remarkable exception to such long-
term trends has been the United States over the last 30 years, where
the median wage has increased only about 9 percent, while productivity
increased by more than 80 percent.
8 This is not to say that redistribution — whether from existing
income or wealth, or new income created through growth — is
unimportant or undesirable. Indeed, as the UNDP points out, it can
potentially make a large difference in poverty reduction (see UNDP,
Human Development Report, pp. 64-71).The Scorecard on Development ! 8
the number of countries in each quintile, for 1960 and
1980.
The only group which does not show a slowdown in
growth is the bottom quintile, with per capita income
between $355 and $1225 annually, where growth
increases slightly, from 1.7 to 1.8 percent. However this
is still a bad average performance for the poorest
developing countries. It is worth noting that this result
is reversed without India and China, despite the fact that
that India and China are counted in the averages here
with no more weight than small countries such as Mali
or Burundi. That is, the averages are not weighted by
either GDP or population. (Since China and India
together account for approximately half of the
population of the developing world, their experiences
are discussed separately in the last section.) So it is only
the large jump in their growth rates in the second period
that drives the improvement for the bottom quintile. It
is also worth noting that the improvement for the bottom
quintile is also dependent on the countries that were
not in the data set for 1960-1980, but are included for
1980-2005.
In any case there is no ambiguity about the overall result,
which does not depend on how the countries are divided
into groups or whether the new countries are included.
There is a sharp slowdown in the rate of growth of per
capita income for the vast majority of low- and middle-
income countries. This is probably the most important
economic change that has taken place in the world during
the last quarter century. It is much more difficult to reduce
poverty or inequality in the face of such a growth
slowdown. When a country’s economy is growing, it is
at least possible for the poor to share equally or even
disproportionately in the gains from productivity growth.
When there is very little growth in income per person,
such improvements are much harder to achieve, and may
be politically impossible to the extent that poverty
alleviation depends on actually reducing the current
income of the middle and upper classes.
One region that has been particularly affected by this
growth slowdown has been Latin America. Income per
capita for the region grew by more than 80 percent from
1960-1979, but only about 11 percent from 1980-2000
and 3 percent for 2000-2005. This has been a drastic
change. If Brazil, for example, had continued to grow at
its pre-1980 rate, the country would have European
living standards today. Mexico would not be far behind.
Instead, the region has suffered its worst 25-year
economic performance in modern Latin American history,
even including the years of the Great Depression.
This is a region that adopted many of the policy reforms
that have characterized the last 25 years. The average
tariff on imported goods was cut by about half from
1970 to 2000.9 Controls on the inflow and outflow of
investment were either removed or drastically reduced
in most countries. Privatization of state-owned
enterprises was undertaken on a massive scale: it
amounted to 178 billion dollars in the 1990s, more than
20 times the value of privatization in Russia after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.10 Latin American countries
also adopted more than 80 IMF programs during the last
25 years. These programs generally required higher real
interest rates as well as budget cuts, which led to
reductions in social spending — as well as other forms
of liberalization.
As a result of this long-term economic failure, many
Latin Americans have blamed the reforms, which are
often labeled “neoliberalism” there. In the last seven years
there have been a number of elections — in Venezuela,
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay — where the
winning candidates campaigned against “neoliberalism,”
and political unrest in other countries based on the same
theme. Still, the long-term growth slowdown, whether
in Latin America or in the developing world generally,
has attracted little attention or debate in policy circles
in the United States.
9 World Development Indicators, 2005
10 Global Development Finance, 2001, World Bank. Tables A4.2 and
A4.3, p. 186Reduced Progress in Health Outcomes
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As would be expected in a period of sharply reduced
economic growth, the last 25 years also shows slower
progress on health outcomes. Figure 2 shows the result
for life expectancy, with countries divided into quintiles
according to their life expectancy at the beginning of
each period. As can be seen in the graph, there is a
noticeable slowdown in all groups except the highest
quintile, which contains countries where life expectancy
is between 69 and 76 years.
The biggest drop was in the fourth quintile, with life
expectancy between 44 and 53. These countries saw an
average annual increase of 0.56 years for 1960-1980,
but almost no progress — 0.03 percent for the second
period. Over 20 or 25 years this makes a large difference.
For the first period, countries in this quintile increased
their life expectancy by about 11 years. If this rate of
improvement had continued, the countries in this
quintile in the second period would have raised life
expectancy by 12 years; instead they saw an increase of
only 0.7 years.
The middle and bottom quintiles also show reduced
progress. The bottom quintile, with life expectancies
between 31 and 44 years, falls from 0.4 years to 0.24
years annual improvement. Over the 22 years of the
second period, this means that life expectancy would
have increased by 4 years more than it actually did, if
not for this fall-off in the rate of progress. For the middle
quintile, with life expectancies between 53 and 63 years,
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1960-1980
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005there is a decline from 0.44 to 0.28  years of annual
improvement. The second quintile shows a smaller
reduction, from 0.20 to 0.14 years. It is worth noting
that even this difference is not insignificant, adding up
to a difference of about one year of life expectancy over
the 22 years.
A significant part of this story is Sub-Saharan Africa,
which dominates the bottom two quintiles for the 1980-
2005 period, and has some impact on the middle
quintile. However, even if all the Sub-Saharan African
countries are removed from the data, there is still a
decline in progress for the bottom three quintiles, with
no change for the second. So the decline in progress on
life expectancy occurs across a broad range of low- and
middle-income countries, and is not confined to any
particular region. Furthermore, the reduced life
expectancies from HIV/AIDS and even the armed
conflicts in Africa are not necessarily completely
exogenous. Per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa grew
The Scorecard on Development ! 10
by a modest, but still significant 36 percent from 1960-
1980. From 1980-2000, income per capita actually
declined — a rare event in modern economic history
over a 20-year period — by about 15 percent. It is
possible that some countries may have been able to deal
with the HIV/AIDS and other public health crises at
least somewhat more effectively if not for the economic
collapse of the second period. Also, the spread of AIDS
is itself partly a result of the increased trade and travel,
including migrant and transport labor, associated with
international economic integration. For all the benefits
that countries can gain as a result of increased commerce,
a potential drawback is the more rapid spread of diseases.
Finally, it is possible that the continent would have seen
less armed conflict over the second period if not for the
economic collapse that took place.
Figures 3 and 4 show the results for life expectancy for
males and females separately. The boundaries for the
five quintiles are different from each other and from the
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direction from the previous charts, with the worst
quintiles on the right. For both males and females, the
bottom three quintiles show a noticeable reduction in
the rate of progress during the second period. For the
fourth quintile, with mortality rates between 270-415
for women and 342-498 for men, there is an actual
increase in mortality of 3.4 per thousand and 2.6 per
thousand annually, respectively, in the second period.
The middle quintile for males also has an increase in
mortality rates, as compared to an annual average 3.8
per thousand decrease per year during the first period.
For females, the second quintile, with mortality rates of
108-165 per thousand, also shows a decline from a 1.7
per thousand annual improvement in the first period to
no improvement in the second period. Male mortality
for the second quintile (195-250 per thousand) shows
overall boundaries in Figure 2, because of the higher
overall life expectancy for females. But the quintiles are
roughly comparable. The results are similar to the overall
result in Figure 2 for the bottom four quintiles, with
somewhat more of a decline in the second quintile for
females. The top quintile is different, with males actually
showing an improvement in the growth of life
expectancy in the second period, while females do not.
The increase in progress for male life expectancy in the
top quintile is driven by high-income countries.11
Figures 5 and 6 show mortality rates for male and female
adults, respectively.12 These are arranged in the opposite
11 This includes Canada, France, Australia, Luxembourg, Belgium,
Germany, New Zealand, and Kuwait.
12 These mortality rates measure the probability of a 15-year-old dying
before age 60 (in deaths per 1,000)
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005slightly better reduction for the second period. In the
top quintile, both males and females show improved
progress on mortality. As with the data for life expectancy,
this improvement is driven by the high-income countries
in this quintile.
The trends in mortality are also heavily influenced by
Sub-Saharan Africa, where the HIV/AIDS crisis and
armed conflict have greatly increased mortality.
According to the UNDP, the conflict in the eastern part
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has resulted
in an estimated 3.8 million “excess deaths” from just
1998-2004, as compared with what would have occurred
in the absence of war. But the decline in adult mortality
for low- and middle-income countries is not determined
by Sub-Saharan Africa. If the Sub-Saharan African
countries are eliminated from the data set for Figure 4,
the bottom two quintiles still show huge declines in the
rate of improvement of mortality, with the middle
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quintile showing no change. And for the reasons
described above, the region should be included.
Figure 7 shows the data for mortality rates for children
under five. This data shows a declining rate of progress
for all five quintiles, although the reduction in progress
is relatively small in the top two quintiles. The biggest
fall-off is for countries in the worst quintile, with child
mortality rates of 227-390 per thousand. The rate of
progress — average annual reduction — falls from 5 per
thousand for 1960-1980 to 3 per thousand from 1980 to
2002.13 For this second period, the cumulative effect of
this reduced progress is an increase in the child mortality
rate of 44 per thousand, or more than the entire child
mortality rate for the best quintile. The next two
quintiles, with child mortality rates of 154-227 and 80-
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005
13 For World Development Indicators February 2005, the last available
year for this data is 2002.The Scorecard on Development ! 13
to what could have been achieved just on the basis of
past progress.
Summing up the data on health outcomes, there is a
significant drop in the rate of progress for the vast
majority of low- and middle-income countries. This is
true for life expectancy, infant and child mortality, and
adult mortality in the second period (since 1980) as
compared with the first period (1960-1980). There are a
few groups of countries that run counter to this result,
but the overall trend is very clear.
154 per thousand also show much reduced progress in
reducing child mortality.
Figure 8 shows the decline in infant mortality rates for
the two periods, arranged by quintiles. Once again, the
reduction in progress is across the board. Even the top
two quintiles, which are not influenced by Sub-Saharan
Africa, show declining progress for the 1980-2002
period. The sharpest fall-off in the rate of progress is
for the fourth quintile, where infant mortality fell by an
average of 2.6 per thousand each year from 1960-1980,
but only 1.3 per thousand from 1980-2002. For the period
as a whole this means that the average country in this
quintile has an infant mortality rate about 29 per
thousand more than it would have had if the progress
of the first period had continued. For a country at the
midpoint of this quintile, e.g. 122 per thousand, this
represents a 31 percent higher infant mortality relative
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second period as compared with the first, but that is not
necessarily harmful; for the higher income countries, it
could represent a reduction in the number of adults that
need remedial primary education classes. Figures 11 and
12 look at the same changes in primary school enrollment
broken down by gender, for male and female primary
school students and school-age children. The overall
changes are similar, although the levels of enrollment
for females are lower than for males, reflecting a
widespread gender bias in education that prevails in
many developing countries.
Figures 13, 14, and 15 show changes in secondary school
enrollment overall, and for males and females,
respectively. There is a decline in the rate of growth of
secondary school enrollment — again as a percentage
of the population in this age group — across all quintiles,
from the first period to the second. The only exception
is the bottom quintile for females, with an average
enrollment of 0-4 percent, which is flat.
Figure 16 shows the average annual changes in tertiary
school enrollment, which is more mixed than the others.
Only the fourth quintile, with just 1-3 percent of its
population in tertiary education, shows reduced progress
in the second period. The others are flat or show
improvement, with the largest improvement in the
second quintile (10-18 percent enrolled), which moves
from a 0.7 to a 1.2 percentage point annual increase.
Figure 17 shows the average annual percentage point
change in literacy. The third and second quintiles, with
literacy rates of 56-76 percent and 76-92 percent,
respectively, show a slower rate of progress during the
second period. The other quintiles are essentially the same
for the two periods.
Summing up the data on education, most low- and
middle-income countries made less progress since 1980
in increasing enrollment at the primary and secondary
levels of education, as compared with the prior period
Given the sharp slowdown in economic growth, it would
not be surprising to find that public spending on
education did not increase as much in the second period
as in the first, and that is indeed the case. Figure 9 shows
the average annual change in public spending on
education for the two periods, as a percentage of GNP.
There is a reduction in the rate of growth of education
spending in all quintiles. For the middle quintile, for
example, the rate of growth falls from 0.10 to 0.04
percentage points annually. This would make a difference
of about 1.3 percent of GDP over a 20 year period —
for illustration, for the United States today this would
be $150 billion of education spending per year. The top
quintile, with countries spending between 5 and 8 percent
of GDP on education, shows an actual reduction of
education spending during the second period. Some of
this is undoubtedly due to demographics, as the higher
income countries especially experienced a reduction in
the number of school age children. However, this would
be less of an explanation in countries that were not
already spending a large percentage of their GDP on
education. The slower rate of increase in public spending
on education for the middle three groups is unlikely to
be a result of just demographic changes.
Given the slowing growth in expenditures on public
education, we would expect reduced progress in
educational outcomes, unless there were large and
widespread improvements in the efficiency of education.
Figure 10 shows the average annual change in the
percentage of students enrolled in primary school. This
measures the number of students enrolled as a
percentage of their age groups. It is possible for the
number to exceed 100 percent, as in the top two
quintiles, due to adults taking remedial or literacy classes.
The bottom two quintiles show a noticeable decline in
the rate of growth of primary school enrollment from
the first to the second period.  The middle quintile is
nearly flat, and the second quintile (with enrollment
between 98 and 108 percent) shows some improvement.
The top quintile shows a faster rate of decline in the(1960-1980). This was not true for tertiary education.
Public spending on education also increased at a slower
rate in the second period, and the rate of progress on
literacy also slowed. This — together with the slowdown
in economic growth — could explain the reduced
progress for low- and middle-income countries on the
educational front. The changes in measures of
educational progress are not as pronounced as indicators
of health outcomes, or of economic growth, but they
are overwhelmingly in the same direction, showing
reduced progress since 1980.
The Scorecard on Development ! 16
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There are a few countries that have actually grown
much faster since 1980 than in prior decades. Among
them are China and India, the world’s two most
populous countries — China now has 1.3 billion people
and India about a billion. Since these countries have
adopted some of “globalizing” or “liberalizing” reforms
over the last 25 years, it is sometimes argued on the
basis of these countries’ experiences that the overall
set of reforms implemented by low- and middle-income
countries worldwide have been a success.
There are two arguments here. First, since these two
countries contain close to half  of the entire population
of the developing world, if we look at people rather
than countries, the policy changes of the last quarter
century have succeeded. The problem with this
argument is that if we are looking at policy changes,
we need to look at countries. Individuals do not control
the investment, trade, interest rate, budget, and other
economic policies that affect their ability to make a
living. It is their governments that make these choices.
But if a set of policy reforms is implemented over a
long period of time in 80 or 90 countries, and only a
few show higher growth rates — and the vast majority
show slower, and often drastically slower growth —
this provides at least a prima facie case that the reforms
have failed. This is true even if those few success stories
happen to be countries with a lot of people.
The other argument is that a few success stories
demonstrate that the reforms can work, if only they
are correctly implemented. It is possible that all the
other countries didn’t implement them fully enough,
or in the right way. One of the World Bank’s answers
to skeptics has been to group countries into
“globalizers” and “non-globalizers” and show that the
globalizers have grown faster over the last decade or
so. The “globalizers” were the countries that showed
the most rapid increase in trade as a percentage of their
economies.14
But even if it were true that some set of “globalizing”
countries — i.e. the ones that correctly implemented a set
of liberalizing reforms — could be found to do better than
the rest during the last 25 years, it would still not explain
the long-term drop in the average rate of growth for the
period. In Latin America, for example, Chile is the only
country that has grown at a faster rate over the last 25
years than it did previously.15 Whatever Chile did that was
successful, it would not explain why the last 25 years have
been such a disaster for Latin America. It is simply not
plausible to argue that Chile is the only country in the
region that carried through the recommended reforms far
enough to achieve benefits. If the nature of the reforms
are such that anything less than full implementation leads
to sacrifice without gain, and the political obstacles are so
great that few countries can attain this level of reform,
then most countries would probably be making the right
decision by not attempting to follow the reform path. A
handful of success stories cannot explain the sharp
slowdown in economic growth in the vast majority of low
and middle-income countries.
China has been most often cited as a globalization or
liberalization success story, including trade and investment
liberalization. And indeed since 1980 it has had one of
the fastest growing economies in world history: GDP per
person grew by an incredible average of 7.15 percent,
increasing sixfold in 25 years to become the second largest
economy in the world. But it did so under a set of economic
policies strikingly different than the reforms implemented
in the vast majority of low- and middle- income countries.
First, China did not liberalize its trade in most goods until
it could compete in those areas in world markets. As late
as 1992 its average tariff was still over 40 percent, about
four times the level that Latin America had in 1974, before
liberalization there. To the extent that trade liberalization
14 See e.g. Dollar and Kraay, "Trade Growth, and Poverty," The World
Bank. June 2001.
15 This is mostly since 1990; the Chilean economy grew by more than 60
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contributed to China’s growth, it may be because it was
done carefully so as not to disrupt existing production
— unlike the indiscriminate opening up to imports that
was adopted in many other countries.
In fact China’s transition to a mixed economy — with
increasing use of markets —was carried out gradually
and carefully. There were pilot projects, Special
Economic Zones (in the 1980s) to experiment with
foreign capital and technology, and gradual
liberalization of prices. All this was deliberately
designed so as to be able to correct mistakes and expand
upon successes, a logical thing to do when policy
makers are entering uncharted territory. As late as 1996,
state owned and collective enterprises accounted for
75 percent of urban employment; even today, 25 years
into China’s economic transition, they still account for
more than one-third of urban jobs.16 This stands in sharp
contrast to the “shock therapy,” massive and rapid
privatization, and rapid decontrol of prices that led to
an economic collapse and loss of nearly half of Russia’s
GDP in five years. That China has been able to manage
its transition without any such setbacks — and by
contrast with record-breaking economic growth over a
25-year period — is a compelling example of how
important economic policy decisions can be.
Even today, China’s banking system is dominated by
four state-owned banks, which have more than 60
percent of the nation’s deposits, assets, and credit.
Foreign influence in the financial system is minimal.
And even after the recent revaluation of the Chinese
renminbi, which included some changes to allow more
flexibility in its peg to the dollar, foreign currency flows
remain strictly controlled.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has soared
from $19 billion in 1990 to more than $53 billion
annually today17, and it has certainly contributed to China’s
growth. But even here the government has had a very big
role in shaping and directing this investment, and
approving investments that would fit in with the country’s
development goals. These include such priorities as
producing for export markets, a high level of technology
(with the goal of transferring technology from foreign
enterprises to the domestic economy), hiring local residents
for managerial and technical jobs, and not competing with
certain domestic industries. China’s policy toward foreign
investment has therefore been directly opposed to the major
worldwide reforms of recent decades, including the rules
of the WTO; the same is also true in the important area
of intellectual property.
In short, China’s economic success over the last quarter-
century cannot simply be summed up — as it so often is
— as an example of the success of the overall package of
reforms that most developing countries have adopted over
the last 25 years. The same is true for India, which is a less
spectacular but still important exception to the general
slowdown of growth after 1980. The Indian economy has
grown by an average of 3.8 percent annually, per capita,
from 1980-2005 — more than double the 1.6 percent
annual rate from 1960-80. But it is difficult to attribute
this transformation to “globalizing” reforms. As in China,
the big increase in economic growth in India took place
more than a decade before liberalization began. India’s
growth took off in 1980, more than a decade before the
liberalizing reforms of 1991. Tariff revenue, measured as
a share of imports or GDP, actually increased significantly
during the 1980s, as did other measures of trade
protection. Similarly, trade increased several times faster
in India in the 1990s than it did in the 1980s. Beginning in
1991, the government embarked upon a rapid reduction
of trade barriers, privatization, some deregulation of
financial markets, measures to encourage foreign direct
investment, and other reforms. But growth did not increase
16 See Prasad, Eswar, ed. “China’s Growth and Integration into the
World Economy,” International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC.
2004
17 World Development Indicators, 2005 (2003 data for FDI).The Scorecard on Development ! 23
over its 1980s rate. So while there is plenty of room for
debate over what caused India to increase its growth
rate at a time when most developing countries were
moving in the opposite direction, the 1990s reforms do
not look like the main answer.18 India’s success story also
included such non-orthodox policies as strict currency
controls. Even after the liberalization of the 1990s, India
retained a higher level of protection for its domestic
markets than most other developing countries.
18 See Dani Rodrik and Arvand Subramaniand, "From 'Hindu Growth
to Productivity Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition."
March 2004.The past quarter century has seen a sharp decline in the
rate of growth for the vast majority of low- and middle-
income countries. Accompanying this decline has been
reduced progress for the almost all of the social indicators
that are available to measure health and educational
outcomes.19 The methodology of this paper precludes
the possibility that this reduced economic and social
progress was a result of “diminishing returns,” i.e., the
increased difficulty of progressing at the same rate from
a higher level. It is therefore likely that at least some of
the policy changes that have been widely implemented
over the last 25 years have contributed to this long-term
growth and development failure. In some of the financial
and economic crises that took place in the late 1990s —
for example in East Asia, Russia, and Argentina — it
seems clear that policy mistakes contributed to severe
economic losses.20
But it is generally difficult to show a clear relationship
between any particular policy change and economic
outcomes, especially across countries. There are many
changes that take place at the same time, and causality
is difficult to establish. It is certainly possible that the
decline in economic and social progress that has taken
place over the last 25 years would have been even worse
in the absence of the policy changes that were adopted.
But that remains to be demonstrated. In the meantime, a
long-term failure of the type documented here should at
the very least shift the burden of proof to those who
maintain that the major policy changes of the last 25
years have raised living standards in the majority of
developing countries, and encourage skepticism with
regard to economists or institutions who believe they
have found a formula for economic growth and
development. Indeed, some economists have recently
concluded that more “policy autonomy” — the ability
of countries to make their own decisions about
economic policy — is needed for developing countries.21
Most importantly, the outcome of the last 25 years
should have economists and policy-makers thinking
about what has gone wrong.
19 It is worth noting the limited basis of the comparisons used in this
analysis. In particular, it would have been desirable to measure national
performances on a variety of environmental measures. Unfortunately,
there are no widely available sets of data for most countries on these
measures; if such data could be assembled, this would be an important
part of a more complete evaluation of the progress of the last quarter-
century.
20  See Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis:
Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects." Harvard Institute for International
Development. April 1998 and see Alan B. Cibils, Mark Weisbrot, and
Debayani Kar, "Argentina Since Default: The IMF and the Depression."
Center for Economic and Policy Research, September 2002.
21 This is the conclusion of Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik, and Arvind
Subramanian.  (“How to Help Poor Countries,” Foreign Affairs,
New York:Jul/Aug 2005.  Vol. 84,  Iss. 4,  p. 136-152) With regard to
China, the authors ask rhetorically, “Would China have been better
off implementing a garden-variety World Bank structural adjustment
program in 1978 instead of its own brand of heterodox gradualism?”
Conclusion: What Went Wrong?
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